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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 09-2370 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD BAEZ, 
       Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-00762-002 
 (Honorable James Knoll Gardner) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 March 7, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  May 26, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In 2008, Richard Baez was found guilty of: conspiracy to interfere with interstate 
commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); aiding and abetting the 
interference with interstate commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and 
aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence in 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  On appeal, Baez contends the District Court committed 
error by failing to make sufficient inquiry over the replacement of a jury member.  We 
will affirm. 
I. 
 On April 17, 2007, Richard Baez drove Miguel Dominguez to the EconoLodge 
hotel in Allentown, Pennsylvania.  While Baez waited in the car, Dominguez entered the 
hotel brandishing a sawed-off shotgun, demanded money from an employee, and stole 
approximately $233 from the cash drawer.  Dominguez got into the waiting car and Baez 
drove them away.  Baez was later arrested and charged with the above counts. 
 At trial, Baez called several character witnesses to testify on his behalf.  After the 
trial’s fourth day, Juror Twelve telephoned the court’s deputy clerk and left a voice 
message.  The deputy clerk did not succeed in reaching the juror that evening but was 
able to speak with her the following morning before court reconvened.  Juror Twelve told 
the deputy clerk that she was concerned for her safety because, while driving home from 
dinner, she encountered one of the defendant’s character witnesses who lived near her. 
 With the consent of both parties, the court interviewed Juror Twelve off the 
record.  The juror said she was driving home from dinner with her windows down when 
the witness looked directly at her, but she was unsure whether the witness recognized her.  
She was frightened by the incident, prompting her to take anti-anxiety medication that 
evening and again the following morning.  She stated she had not disclosed the incident 
to the other jurors, an assertion the court found credible.  The court informed the parties 
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that Juror Twelve appeared calm and collected and her demeanor would not have been 
likely to arouse concern with the other jurors. 
 With the agreement of both parties, the judge replaced Juror Twelve with an 
alternate.  The court informed the remaining jurors that Juror Twelve was replaced for 
good reason and they should not speculate on why she was excused.  Throughout the 
trial, the court had repeatedly cautioned the jurors not to discuss the case before 
deliberations.  And in its jury charge, the court instructed the jury to decide the case 
based only on the evidence presented. 
 Baez was convicted on all counts.  The court sentenced him to 153 months’ 
imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $200.  Baez 
now contends the court’s dismissal of Juror Twelve without conducting a specific inquiry 
of the remaining jury members for bias or prejudice was error. 
II. 
 Because Baez, by his own admission, did not object at trial, we review for plain 
error.  United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 174 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  In 
order to prevail under a plain error standard, Baez must show (1) there was error, (2) the 
error was plain, and (3) the error affected substantial rights, i.e., affected the outcome of 
the proceedings.  United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Baez contends the court erred by interviewing Juror Twelve off the record.  The 
court explicitly advised both parties of its plan to speak with Juror Twelve privately, and 
both parties consented.  The trial court has substantial discretion in the manner of 
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inquiring into jury prejudice.  See United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 301-02 (3d Cir. 
2007) (noting when dealing with jury misconduct “the District Court was in the best 
position to understand and respond to the exigencies of the situation”).  It was not error, 
let alone plain error, for the court to speak to the juror off the record.  Both parties agreed 
to the court’s approach.  The court immediately recounted on the record the substance of 
the private interview and described the juror’s demeanor.  Furthermore, Baez has not 
shown the “error” affected his substantial rights.  There is no indication conducting the 
conversation on the record would have affected the outcome of the proceeding. 
 Baez also claims the court erred in failing to question the remaining jurors for 
possible prejudice.  In determining whether to voir dire the entire jury, the trial court 
must “balance the potential benefits of further investigation against the possible harm of 
calling attention to a relatively minor situation about which the other jurors may have 
been unaware.”  United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1395 (3d Cir. 1994).  We accord 
deference to the trial court’s balancing because we, “as an appellate tribunal, are in a poor 
position to evaluate these competing considerations; we have only an insentient record 
before us.”  Id.  (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 It was not error to decline to question other jurors when there was no indication 
they were aware of the situation.
1
  After interviewing Juror Twelve, the court described to 
                                                 
1
 Baez primarily relies on our decision in Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 
F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).  In Dowling, we found error in declining to question the jury 
after a juror advised the court that the jury had been exposed to extra-record information 
about the case and the defendant’s past criminal record, including a prior conviction for 
bank robbery.  Dowling, 814 F.2d at 135.  Here, voir dire of the jury presented the risk of 
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both parties her calm demeanor, explained that she had not spoken to any other jurors 
about her concerns, and concluded that nothing about her manner would indicate to 
another juror that there was something amiss.  We give deference to the trial court’s 
findings as to the juror’s demeanor and credibility.  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 304-05.  There 
was no indication the jury was exposed to the information involving Juror Twelve’s 
dismissal other than the court’s instruction on the matter.  Therefore, we conclude the 
court did not commit error, let alone plain error, in declining to question the remaining 
jurors for possible prejudice. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.  
                                                                                                                                                             
disclosing issues to which the jury was previously unaware, a factor not present in 
Dowling. 
